





















1. What is legislation? What is law? A great deal of ink has been spilled on these questions. Legal theorists are far and away the primary offenders. In this essay, however, I wish to investigate the answers that have been provided in international law.
	2. It comes as no surprise that international lawyers often think about what law is. But it is perhaps less obvious that there might be talk of “legislation” in international law. For some, this will already seem a little unusual. We speak about national legislation, certainly – but international legislation? In fact, the idea that legislation is being made at the international level is an old one. And more recently, there has emerged a large body of literature in which it is claimed that the United Nations Security Council has begun to legislate on the international plane.
	3. Two theses will be advanced in this essay. First, there is a misunderstanding in international law about what legislation is; it is mistakenly thought that legislation is general. The second thesis attempts to specify how this misunderstanding of legislation has come about. In international law writing one commonly finds a more basic mistake about what law is; the literature tends to evince the mistaken view that law is general.
	4. Both these mistakes matter. Among other things, they raise doubts about the literature on international law-making. But I do not think that this should be startling to international lawyers – or, for that matter, interested readers in other fields. The re-evaluation of basic ideas is a healthy enterprise, even (or especially) if they are generally accepted. Indeed, disagreement about our understanding of legislation and law is routine in other fields such as legal theory. There is nothing curious or alarming when one legal theorist challenges another about her understanding of legislation, law, and so on. It is in that spirit that this essay is written. And while the aim is to interrogate some basic theoretical assumptions about legislation and law, I have done my best to present the analysis in a way that requires no background in legal theory.
	5. Here is the plan. I will begin with the first thesis: there is, in international law, a misunderstanding about what legislation is. I will canvass how legislation has been understood in international law, before explaining how that understanding is misplaced. I will also ask how we might think about legislation in a more promising way. I will then turn to defend the second thesis, which seeks to explain why this misunderstanding of legislation has come about. One key reason is that a mistake has been made about what law is. The essay will conclude by discussing several implications of the two theses.

II. The First Thesis: A Misunderstanding about Legislation

II.A. Preparing the Ground

6. In international law, it is thought that legislation is general in character. I will argue that this understanding of legislation is misplaced; this is the first thesis that I will be defending.
	7. Some initial groundwork is necessary – that is, I ought to expand on what international lawyers have been saying about legislation. Something should be said about this because, as I suggested at the outset, although there is talk of legislation at the international level this will seem unusual to some people’s eyes. We tend to speak about international treaties, they might think, or customary international law, but not really international legislation.
	8. In fact, talk of legislation on the international plane is plentiful, and has a long history. I will get to some of that history shortly. At this stage, it will be easier to find our bearings if we focus on one particular claim that has been made about legislation. International lawyers have claimed that the United Nations Security Council has begun to “legislate” on the international plane. This claim is very widely endorsed, and discussing it will introduce more clearly the underlying assumptions in international legal thinking about what legislation is.

II.B. An Example: Security Council “Legislation”

9. A little background may be helpful. The Security Council is an organ of the United Nations, and is empowered by the Charter of the United Nations to adopt decisions (or resolutions, as they are usually known) in a variety of circumstances. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council is empowered to adopt a resolution if it has determined that there is a threat to international peace and security.​[1]​ Chapter VII resolutions are legally binding on all Member States of the UN – meaning, in practice, virtually every State in the world.​[2]​
	10. International lawyers have pointed to several binding Chapter VII resolutions which in their view demonstrate that the Security Council has begun to legislate on the international plane. Two resolutions have received significant attention: Resolution 1373 (2001) on the fight against international terrorism, and Resolution 1540 (2004) on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.​[3]​ 
	11. First, on 28 September 2001 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373. This resolution sought to combat international terrorism by various means. For example, it called for the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorism, and called upon States not to support, harbour or provide safe havens for terrorists and their supporters. States were also expected to ensure that terrorist acts were criminalized in their national legal systems, and to share information about terrorist plots or movements.
	12. A second example is Resolution 1540, which was unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 28 April 2004. This resolution called upon States to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, focusing in particular on non-State actors who were seeking to acquire such weapons. For example, States were called upon to establish appropriate domestic controls, to cooperate more fully with each other, and to strengthen and implement existing multilateral treaties dealing with the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
	13. Resolutions 1373 and 1540 address global issues: international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The claim that has been advanced is that they are “legislative” in character. They are thought to be markedly different from the normal pattern of Security Council action, in that normally the Security Council adopts resolutions in relation to specific “situations” – e.g. Resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation in Iraq and Kuwait, or Resolution 1244 (1999) concerning the situation in Kosovo. Such resolutions, illustrative of how the Security Council typically operates, are not deemed to possess the legislative character of Resolutions 1373 and 1540 because they are limited (often both spatially and temporally) to specific situations.
	14. It is worth adding that this claim that the Security Council has begun to legislate is popular, and thought to be important. This is amply demonstrated by the extensive references to and discussion of the claim in international law writing.​[4]​ For example, José Alvarez has argued that Security Council resolutions such as Resolution 1373 “present the clearest examples of that body’s new ‘legislative’ phase”, in the sense that “the Council is longer responding with discrete action directed at a particular state because of a concrete threat to the peace arising from a specific incident”.​[5]​ Alvarez has also stated, in a discussion about Resolution 1373, that “legislative acts worthy of the name are general in nature”.​[6]​ Christian Tams, again referring to Resolution 1373, has claimed that the Security Council “has … assumed the role of a legislator fast-tracking the usual, and cumbersome, treaty-making process”.​[7]​
	15. References to Security Council legislation have not been confined to academic writing, either. For example, during the drafting of Resolution 1540 the President of the Security Council described some of the work of the Security Council as “legislative”.​[8]​
	16. Underlying all of this is a theoretical assumption about what legislation is. The view taken in international law is that legislation is in some sense general – and that this property of generality importantly marks out Resolutions 1373 and 1540 as legislation.
	17. As we can see, Resolutions 1373 and 1540 have received plenty of attention; the claim is that, by adopting these resolutions, the Security Council has begun to legislate on the international plane. But it is interesting to note that there has also been discussion of legislative Security Council resolutions which preempts the adoption of Resolutions 1373 and 1540. And again the assumption is that legislation is general. For instance, Christian Tomuschat speculated in 1993 about the possibility of Security Council “legislative” measures, and characterized such measures as being abstract and general.​[9]​ Discussing his role as legal adviser to Finland’s delegation to the Security Council, Martti Koskenniemi explained that he was involved in “the negotiation of generally formulated, ‘legislative’ resolutions (such as a resolution on plastic explosives and on terrorism)” in the period 1989-1990.​[10]​ Koskenniemi also argued that the Security Council’s “setting up of two ad hoc war crimes tribunals to issue binding judgments seems already precariously close to international legislation”.​[11]​ This is a reference to Resolution 827 (1993) establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and Resolution 955 (1994) establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda – both adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The legislative character of these last two resolutions has also been pushed by Yoram Dinstein:

So far, the Security Council has adopted not two [i.e., Resolutions 1373 and 1540] but four Chapter VII resolutions amounting to legislation. The two earlier resolutions were adopted in 1993 and 1994 as regards the establishment of the two International Criminal Tribunals on the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively … By now, the question whether the Security Council has the power to legislate appears to me to have been overtaken by events. The Security Council exercises that power as a matter of course under Chapter VII.​[12]​

18. I should add that, for our purposes, we need not worry about settling this debate as to precisely when the Security Council began to legislate – i.e., which were the first “legislative” resolutions. The key point is that, of the various positions on offer, the underlying assumption is the same: legislation is general in character.
	19. There have been a few criticisms about whether, as a theoretical matter, certain Security Council resolutions can properly be characterized as legislation. Again, however, these criticisms continue to assume that legislation is general. For instance, Georges Abi-Saab has explained that “[t]o me, and in general, legislation stricto sensu signifies the enactment of prospective, general and abstract rules of conduct that bind all the subjects in the unlimited future, whenever the contingencies they provide for obtain”.​[13]​ On this basis, he doubts whether (any) Security Council resolutions may properly be characterized as legislative.​[14]​ In a monograph on the Security Council, Antonios Tzanakopoulos has argued that the Security Council “may impose non-forcible measures, acting under Chapter VII, of such generality so as to qualify as ‘legislative’ measures”.​[15]​ Tzanakopoulos does make mention of “the many objections that may be voiced over whether a binding resolution of the Council under Chapter VII may be termed ‘legislation’ or be equated to State legislation in any way”.​[16]​ But the objections that he has in mind concern whether certain Security Council resolutions warrant being characterized as legislation, rather than what legislation actually is (i.e., the standard view that legislation is general). And in later work he himself affirms that the Security Council, in adopting Resolutions 1373 and 1540, has begun to legislate.​[17]​
	20. Some of the criticisms are older, in that they were expressed prior to the adoption of Resolutions 1373 and 1540. But once again we find the same theoretical assumption: legislation is general.​[18]​ Thus, Sir Michael Wood, in his examination of the history of Security Council resolutions leading up to 1998, argued that these situation-specific resolutions were “not legislation” because they did “not lay down new rules of general application”.​[19]​ Writing in 2000, Georg Nolte suggested that

the Council could one day be confronted with demands to enact, under Chapter VII, general rules concerning weapons of mass destruction or the protection of the environment … If [attempts to justify such demands] were accepted, however, the Security Council could then establish itself as a world legislator, a role for which it was not designed.​[20]​

And as regards whether the Security Council could ever legislate, Alain Pellet suggested that Security Council resolutions could never be legislative because they could not truly be general in character.​[21]​
	21. Finally, some writers appear to hedge their bets. While they are not outwardly critical of the claim that the Security Council has begun to legislate in Resolutions 1373 and 1540, they use more qualified terms such as “quasi-legislative”,​[22]​ possibly as a way of expressing their hesitancy about the claim. It is not entirely clear what it means to say that a resolution is quasi-legislative. Still, even here legislation continues to supply the framework for the discussion.
	22. None of this is intended to set in motion a doctrinal (or, as lawyers sometimes say, “black letter”) analysis of the Security Council and its legal powers. Nor am I seeking to make a normative argument about how the Security Council ought to act – that is, how it ought to exercise the legal powers that it does possess.
	23. Rather, I am interested in the very idea of legislation that underlies and informs the thinking in this and other areas of international law – and in the question whether that idea has been misunderstood. I have introduced the debate about whether the Security Council has begun to “legislate” for one reason only: to draw out an underlying theoretical assumption about what legislation is. The assumption is that legislation is in some sense general.

II.C. Further Examples of International Law Writing on Legislation

24. We have had a sampling of the arguments about Security Council “legislation”. Importantly, though, the view that legislation is general is not restricted to that debate but can be found throughout international law.
	25. For example, in the literature on international treaties it is frequently said that certain treaties are “legislative”, or “legislation-like”, because they are general.​[23]​ Joseph Weiler has suggested that “[l]egislative treaties … are general in nature and as such [are] different from … [m]ultilateral contractual treaties” and bilateral treaties.​[24]​ And Samantha Besson has written that “[l]egislation-like treaties give rise to general obligations, while contract-like treaties only provide relative and reciprocal obligations”.​[25]​
	26. Such thinking has a long pedigree, too.​[26]​ Sir Hersch Lauterpacht had written in 1927 that “some treaties are of more permanent and general application than others, and … resemble therefore an act of legislation”.​[27]​ Later in his career Lauterpacht assumed the role of the International Law Commission’s Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties. Among his proposed draft articles he advanced a draft Article 16, according to which there were

multilateral treaties, such as the Charter of the United Nations, partaking of a degree of generality which imparts to them the character of legislative enactments properly affecting all members of the international community or which must be deemed to have been concluded in the international interest.​[28]​

27. Also, in 1969 Edward Yemin, who was focusing on the UN context, argued that

[l]egislative acts [in the UN] have three essential characteristics: they are unilateral in form, they create or modify some element of a legal norm, and the legal norm in question is general in nature, that is, directed to indeterminate addressees and capable of repeated application in time.​[29]​

This account was described by Frederic Kirgis as “[a] widely accepted definition of legislative authority in the UN setting”.​[30]​ And even in the literature which is sceptical that there is any such thing as international legislation, it continues to be assumed that legislation is general.​[31]​

II.D. Explaining the Misunderstanding

28. The prevailing view in international law is that legislation is general in character. I will now try to show why this view is mistaken.
	29. To keep the analysis manageable, I will focus on a formulation of legislation offered by Stefan Talmon.​[32]​ This formulation purports to describe an essential truth about all legislation, whether it is found on the national or international plane. (And as it happens, Talmon also endorses the claim that the Security Council, in adopting Resolutions 1373 and 1540, has begun to legislate on the international plane.​[33]​)
	30. What is Talmon’s formulation of legislation? Although he uses the expression “international legislation”, he explains that legislation in international law, “in its basic features, remains identical with national legislation”.​[34]​ He then argues that the basic feature (or hallmark​[35]​) of legislation is “the general and abstract character of the obligations imposed”.​[36]​ The key parts of the formulation are the properties of generality and abstractness. Talmon thinks that these properties are true of any international or national legislation. All legislation imposes general and abstract obligations.
	31. This formulation of legislation faces four problems. These include, among other things, neglecting to distinguish between different types of law. Taken together, the four problems are sufficiently extensive that nothing can be salvaged from the formulation.
	32. Engaging with Talmon’s writing on legislation is useful for several reasons. First, he provides an open and lucid discussion. Second, Talmon’s formulation is representative of the prevailing thinking about legislation in international law. Many international lawyers have relied upon this formulation directly, and his writing has been cited frequently.​[37]​ Thus, Anne Peters, citing Talmon, explains that “[a] Council decision has a legislative character when it imposes general and abstract obligations”.​[38]​ Other international lawyers use – explicitly or implicitly – a formulation of legislation which is identical, or virtually identical, to Talmon’s formulation.​[39]​ And while some international lawyers may not endorse every aspect or detail of Talmon’s account, it is very difficult to find writing which challenges the core of Talmon’s understanding of legislation – namely, that legislation is general. This view of legislation is, as we have seen, ubiquitous in international law. Third, constructive engagement with Talmon’s formulation is useful because, in considering various problems with that formulation, we will hopefully clarify our own thinking about what legislation is (and what it is not).​[40]​

II.D.i. The first problem

33. First, it is unclear why Talmon limits legislation to the imposition of obligations. Legislation may, for instance, confer powers or permissions. A legislative act may also contain provisions which do not yield norms. Thus, a legislative provision which is simply defining the word “trust” is not imposing an obligation, conferring a power, and so on.​[41]​
	34. In addition, legislative enactments may, among other things, be declaratory, hortatory or aspirational.​[42]​ Legislators who pass declaratory legislation may be attempting to restate or codify the existing law, including existing case law. There are, for example, many provisions in UK statutes employing “for the avoidance of doubt” expressions.​[43]​ Where a legislative provision is purely declaratory, it does nothing to change what subjects are already legally required, empowered or permitted to do; the provision does not yield any new norms, nor does it change the content – or the weight – of existing norms.​[44]​ In that sense it is a case of the law doubling up. As for hortatory or aspirational legislation, it is possible that legislative provisions offer words of encouragement or set out sweeping objectives such as the promotion of well-being or social cohesion.

II.D.ii. The second problem

35. Here is a second problem. Talmon’s formulation of legislation holds that legislative acts are “general and abstract in character”. But he does not explain the different elements of this expression. Why must legislation be general and abstract? What is the relationship – or difference, if any – between generality and abstractness? Can a legal norm be general but not abstract? Or is the formulation simply tautological? These are significant uncertainties at the heart of the formulation.
	36. We tend to think that the terms “general” and “abstract” describe different properties. Explaining the difference, however, may be less straightforward. For one thing, writers may understand these notions in various, often context-sensitive ways.​[45]​
	37. Nevertheless, taking generality first, the following is a plausible proposition about legal norms that are general:

G: A legal norm is general if it provides a standard of conduct that may be repeatedly applied from case to case.​[46]​

Generality is demonstrated when a given legal norm applies to instances (actions, omissions, and so on) which share a common feature – that common feature satisfying the application of the legal norm. Here it should be noted that G describes a rule. Rules are by definition general; they are capable of repeated application.​[47]​
	38. While a rule may be applied repeatedly, this says nothing about how many subjects are regulated by the rule. To this end we may further specify one element of G:

G1: The standard of conduct applies to one subject.

G2: The standard of conduct applies to more than one subject.​[48]​

An example of G1 is a personal (self-imposed) rule. For instance, I might make a rule for myself that I should watch a horror film every week. Sometimes it is thought that general legal norms – rules – are only of the G2 type. That is a mistake, because it denies the incidence of rules which, while capable of repeated application, only purport to regulate one subject.​[49]​ By contrast, a one-time instruction may be directed to many subjects – for instance, an instruction to all my law students to attend a group meeting on 6 October 2017 – but it is not a rule because it is not capable of repeated application.​[50]​
	39. If this clarifies how a legal norm may be general, what about the property of abstractness? Abstractness is harder to pin down in the context of legal norms. One helpful explanation is put forward by Timothy Endicott. He draws upon two examples – a rule imposing a blood-alcohol limit on motorists (say, 80 milligrammes of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood), and a rule prohibiting dangerous driving:

Generality in itself is not enough to make a standard abstract – blood-alcohol limits apply generally. But blood-alcohol limits are not abstract, because of the specificity of the consideration they appeal to. The blood-alcohol limit applies generally to a class, but that class (the class of people who have a certain proportion of alcohol in their blood) is uniform in a way that allows precision. A prohibition on dangerous driving is not merely general but abstract, because it regulates activities that do not share any such uniform feature that would allow precision. The important variations among the class of dangerous drivers (the class of people using a motor vehicle in a way that unreasonably causes a serious risk to others) makes it impossible to specify the class in a way that allows precision.​[51]​

40. In light of all this, it is not obvious how we should understand the expression “general and abstract” in Talmon’s formulation of legislation. If generality and abstractness are not identical, we must ask why legislation requires both properties. Talmon’s formulation may suggest that, in the absence of one such property, the act in question is not legislative. But this might mean, for instance, that a rule stipulating a blood-alcohol limit for motorists could not be a legislative rule because it is not abstract – a conclusion which lawyers would not find convincing.

II.D.iii. The third problem

41. In the remaining analysis I will treat the expression “general and abstract” as describing a single property – namely, the generality of the legal norm in question.​[52]​ This, I think, is the gist of Talmon’s understanding of legislation. Even so, his formulation faces a further problem. A formulation of legislation, if it is to be a formulation of legislation (as opposed to anything else), must be discriminating. For our purposes, the formulation must discriminate between legislation and other types of law.
	42. Talmon’s formulation of legislation fails to discriminate. It indicates that any legal norm that is “general and abstract” (and I take this to mean “general”) is legislative. This would indicate, for example, that many norms of customary international law count as (international) legislation.
	43. In international law writing there can sometimes be a lack of clarity about the different types of law-making. Legislating is often treated as a synonym for law-making, rather than as one type of law-making which is to be distinguished from others.​[53]​ This includes some of Talmon’s own writing on the matter. He states that “for a long time, the perceived wisdom was … that the states are the legislators of the international legal system”.​[54]​ If this is true, what legislation have States been producing (according to received wisdom)? Does customary international law constitute legislation (when made by States)?
	44. It would appear so. Talmon goes on to explain how international lawyers have used the expression “international legislation” to “describe the conclusion of lawmaking treaties … the making of customary international law”, and so on.​[55]​
	45. But consider customary law again. The problem emerges with particular clarity in relation to national legal systems. When legislation and customary law are recognized as sources of law in national legal systems, a clear distinction is drawn between them precisely because they are different types of law. This is true, for instance, of the various legal systems that recognize indigenous custom as a source of law; and the distinction matters, because a given customary norm may be preempted or displaced by legislation.​[56]​ In spite of this, Talmon’s formulation transforms custom into legislation, since many customary norms will be general.
	46. Talmon’s formulation of legislation is therefore over-inclusive. It encompasses many types of law which we do not regard as legislation, and which we would properly distinguish from legislation – e.g. customary law. In this way, his formulation overlooks the differences between legislation and other types of law.

II.D.iv. The fourth problem

47. Finally, Talmon’s formulation of legislation indicates that we do not have legislation where the legal norm in question is non-general. His formulation treats generality as an essential condition – a “basic feature” – which must be satisfied if the norm in question is to be legislative. But this runs into problems when we consider national legislation. It may be recalled that Talmon suggests that, in its basic features, international legislation is identical to national legislation. Many national legislative acts, however, are non-general.​[57]​
	48. The Westminster Parliament has enacted non-general legislation, the most obvious examples being Private or Personal Acts of Parliament. These Acts of Parliament may address such issues as the inheritance or management of an estate, the naturalization of an individual, or enabling the marriage of two people. Between 1539 and 1973, over 11,000 Private or Personal Acts were passed.​[58]​ For example, there was a Personal Act in 1975 entitled “James Hugh Maxwell (Naturalisation)”.
	49. In Germany, federal legislation has been enacted concerning individual transport projects connecting East and West Germany after their reunification in 1990. The idea was that a legislative solution would accelerate these transport projects, which would otherwise be caught up in time-consuming administrative procedures such as consultations and impact assessments.​[59]​ One such federal legislative act concerned the construction of a section of the railway link between Oebisfelde and Berlin, as part of a high-speed connection between Hanover and Berlin.​[60]​ This act, known as the Südumfahrung Stendal Act (Lex Stendal), was challenged in the German Federal Constitutional Court as being unconstitutional, but its constitutionality was upheld. Among other things, the court indicated that the German Basic Law did not require that the legislature only make general enactments.​[61]​
	50. Non-general federal legislation has also been enacted in the US. For example, an Act of Congress was passed on 21 March 2005 granting jurisdiction to a federal court in Florida to determine whether the withholding of life-sustaining treatment from Terri Schiavo, a woman in a persistent vegetative state, was unlawful.​[62]​
	51. Private relief bills are not uncommon in the US Congress. And when it comes to non-general state legislation, the history of many US state legislatures is telling. As Robert Ireland has explained:

Until the mid- to late-nineteenth century, state legislatures mostly enacted local, private, and special legislation, and very little general legislation. Local legislation refers to statutes that apply to localities rather than to the state as a whole. Private legislation refers to statutes benefitting individuals rather than the general public. Special legislation can be either local or private … General legislation applies to the entire state.​[63]​

He further notes that

[s]tate legislatures inherited their tradition of special legislation from their colonial antecedents, which, in turn, adopted the practice from Parliament. By the establishment of the English colonies in North America, it was customary in England for individuals and localities to petition Parliament for legislative redress of their particular problems.​[64]​

Ireland describes the problem in vivid detail. In nineteenth-century US state legislatures, before procedures were reformed “the ratio of special to general legislation ranged from three to one to more than ten to one”.​[65]​ The sheer quantity of special legislation was criticized as being (among other things) a source of great confusion, undemocratic (in responding to special interests), and highly inefficient.
	52. We could keep going. On 9 June 2017 Japan’s National Diet enacted legislation permitting Emperor Akihito to abdicate. (Akihito had previously spoken about his advanced age.) The special legislation applies only to Akihito; in accordance with the Imperial Household Law of 1947, future emperors may not relinquish the Chrysanthemum Throne. There are, then, countless examples of non-general legislative acts.​[66]​
	53. Talmon’s formulation of legislation purports to accommodate the national practice, and yet much of the practice is at odds with the formulation.​[67]​ The third criticism indicated that Talmon’s formulation was over-inclusive. This fourth criticism indicates that it is simultaneously under-inclusive. It excludes legal acts which are not general but which we would properly regard as legislative acts.
	54. Summing up, I have suggested four criticisms of Talmon’s understanding of legislation. There may be further problems which I have overlooked. But if these four criticisms are correct, Talmon’s formulation of legislation is not convincing. More significant is that, at its core, the formulation reflects wider thinking about legislation – namely, the prevailing view in international law that legislation is general. That view succumbs to many of the problems that have been discussed and so fails to persuade.
	55. At the same time, our criticisms should be tempered in relation to the literature which refers only in passing to the claim that the Security Council has begun to “legislate”. In many such cases we do know what the writers really mean to say. They mean to refer to more general Security Council resolutions, and are borrowing a common vocabulary without necessarily intending to advance a theoretical proposition about legislation. In such cases we should recognize, but also forgive, infelicities of expression.

III. What Is Legislation?

56. The idea that legislation is general is a content-based view of legislation. Whether a legal act is legislative depends on its content – i.e., the generality of the normative content. If this is not a persuasive view, how should legislation be understood?
	57. One way of proceeding is to ask whether any alternative views about legislation may be uncovered in international law writing. As we might expect, such views are rather tough to find. I have come across a handful of instances and for various reasons they may not carry us very far. For example, in 1990 Maurice Mendelson wrote about how international treaties should be characterized (including, in particular, whether they were akin to contracts), and suggested in passing that national legislation could be non-general.​[68]​ This represents a possible outlier to the standard view of legislation in international law. The observations are confined to a few sentences, however, which naturally limits what may be reliably elicited about the notion of legislation.
	58. Another possible instance that I have come across is Nico Krisch’s discussion of Security Council legislation under the UN Charter. But as the following passage indicates, it is not exactly clear what Krisch’s view is:

By allowing for binding measures under Chapter VII, the Charter authorizes the [Security Council] to create new law and thus to act, to a certain degree, as a legislator. On this basis, the [Security Council] can regulate State behaviour worldwide and for extended periods of time. Thus, in cases such as Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, or Sierra Leone, embargoes on certain products, services, and actions were in force over years. But although this constitutes legislation in form, it is, in principle, confined to specific situations and preliminary effects; it ends when the threat to the peace that has given rise to the measures disappears. Thus, such law-creation can be regarded as analogous to executive regulation rather than true legislation.​[69]​

Krisch subsequently describes Resolutions 1373 and 1540 as representing “the move towards legislation” by the Security Council, and protests that “[t]he Charter does not assign legislative powers to any organ and only grants the [Security Council] mandatory powers for action in specific crises, not for addressing generic threats through general norms”.​[70]​ It is a little hard to know how best to read these remarks. Krisch may be thinking that, although legislation may in principle be general or non-general, the central case of legislation – or “true legislation” – is general in character. If so, we would still need some account as to why this is the central case of legislation.​[71]​ At the same time, Krisch’s subsequent remarks about Resolutions 1373 and 1540 cast some doubt on this reading, and might instead suggest that his analysis is better understood as according with the standard view of legislation in international legal thinking.
	59. One last instance that I wish to highlight is Anna Hood’s account of Security Council legislation, which she defines as “Security Council Resolutions that create or modify international legal obligations”.​[72]​ In light of this, Hood argues, for example, that “[t]he Council has issued a wide array of legislative resolutions including those that create or modify specific legal obligations in relation to a target state”,​[73]​ citing by way of illustration a requirement under paragraph 8(a) of Resolution 687 (1991) that Iraq unconditionally accept the destruction or removal of its chemical and biological weapons. Hood also recognizes that “in domestic contexts legislation can create specific legal obligations such as private acts, acts of attainder and acts of pains and penalties”.​[74]​ Hood’s view, very clearly, is that legislated norms may be non-general. But while her account of legislation holds greater promise, it also presents some difficulties. One problem is that it remains content-based in the sense that legislative acts are acts “that create or modify … legal obligations”. And we have seen that the content of legislation can vary; legislative provisions need not impose obligations.​[75]​ In addition, Hood’s proposal is overly broad in that it encompasses many acts that, while they create or modify legal obligations, ought to be distinguished from legislative acts.​[76]​ One example is a judicial order – e.g. an order issued by a court that I pay Hector a sum in compensation for my breach of contract.​[77]​ This order imposes a new legal obligation, but normally we would deny that it is a legislative act.
	60. It seems, then, that these alternative views about legislation that we find in international law do not quite manage to satisfy. But should we be surprised? The quest for a sound understanding of legislation is theoretically demanding. Among other things, a developed analysis would benefit from juxtaposing legislation with other types of law, thereby sharpening our understanding of the similarities and differences between different types of law.
	61. I could not hope to attempt such a task here. It may, however, be convenient to pause and reflect briefly on some of the arguments that have been presented in the theoretical literature. As we shall see, these theoretical accounts offer clarity in important areas. But they are not the final word.
	62. Let us turn to the theoretical literature. One account is offered by John Gardner, who attempts to distinguish between legislated law, customary law and case law.​[78]​ He identifies three features of legislation that, when put together, may help in differentiating it from the other types of law: legislation is expressly made, intentionally made, and made by a single agent.​[79]​ Legislation is expressly made in that it is articulated.​[80]​ It is intentionally made in the sense that the actors who participate in legislating do so by virtue of deliberate acts (e.g. voting by raising one’s hand to indicate “Yes”).​[81]​ Finally, legislation is the act of a single agent. The legislator may be a single individual (e.g. King Rex). Or there may be a legislative assembly comprising hundreds of individuals, in which case they act as a single concerted agent when legislating.
	63. These suggested features of legislation are not wholly uncontroversial. Jeremy Waldron, for example, has queried whether legislation – at least when enacted by large assemblies – should be understood in a unitary manner as the act of a single agent.​[82]​ Moreover, since Gardner’s analysis does not purport to be exhaustive, there may still be gaps to fill. For instance, the three features of legislation that Gardner identifies, if true, would also seem to pick out judicial orders as legislation. A judicial order is expressly made, intentionally made, and made by a single agent. Two possible responses present themselves: first, perhaps judicial orders really should be understood theoretically as legislative acts; or, second (and more plausibly), there are additional features of legislation which serve to exclude judicial orders.​[83]​
	64. There is, of course, more that can be said. My aim here is modest, however: it is simply to recalibrate the thinking about legislation in international law by drawing attention to other accounts of legislation that, while not impervious to criticism, merit consideration. It is also noteworthy that in these accounts there is no suggestion that legislative acts are necessarily general – and rightly so.​[84]​ In principle, the content of legislative acts is unrestricted. This includes their normative content: if, as is commonly the case, a given legislative act is norm-bearing,​[85]​ the norms so yielded may equally possess any content (in principle).
	65. This is not to deny that there may be content-based constraints on which legal norms may validly be enacted by legislators within a particular legal system. For instance, Article I, Section 9, paragraph 3 of the US Constitution prohibits bills of attainder. It is important not to be misled by these kinds of constraints on validity, for their existence is entirely contingent to a given legal system. By contrast, our concern is the idea of legislation. That is what animates the writing on legislation in international law. According to this literature, it is the idea of legislation that may bear analytical fruit when applied to the international plane.

IV. Objections to the First Thesis

66. I will consider two important objections to the thesis that legislation has been misunderstood in international law. I will argue that neither objection is persuasive.

IV.A. The First Objection: International Legislation is Different

67. In international law it is claimed that legislation is general. The claim is descriptive in that it purports to describe existing practices, whether on the national or international plane. But as we have seen the claim faces several problems including descriptive inaccuracy – e.g. overlooking the plentiful evidence of non-general national legislation.
	68. Some international lawyers may therefore elect to break ranks.​[86]​ They may instead suggest that, on this matter, international law is simply different from national legislation. It may be that national legislation can be general or non-general, but international legislation is necessarily general – and the two should not, in this respect, be equated. Or so the objection might run. It is worth preempting this line of argument and explaining the various hurdles that it must overcome. I will first examine how the objection might best be put. I will then raise some doubts about the evidence that might be deployed in support.

IV.A.i. Formulating the objection

69. There is an immediate worry about this objection. The original claim was that certain acts on the international plane were legislative acts. That claim drew explicitly or otherwise upon an underlying view about legislation – the idea being that we would, quite naturally, be informed by our knowledge of legislation in national legal systems. Indeed, that was what made the claim interesting. The notion of international legislation was interesting precisely because it invited comparison with national legislation. We already had some grasp of what legislation was from our understanding of national legal systems – and the interesting question was whether there was, correspondingly, legislative activity taking place on the international plane.​[87]​
	70. The objection seems to undercut this because it suggests that the very drawing of a comparison is in certain respects misguided. International law is just different on this matter, one might say, and should be taken on its own terms. This leaves the objection in a rather peculiar place. On the one hand, it is claimed that there is international legislation being made, and that this is interesting and important. On the other hand, international legislation is just “different” from what we might commonly understand by legislation. So why is the claim interesting? And why use the expression “international legislation” in the first place? Why would it matter which expression we used? These concerns may mean that it is less likely that the objection will be advanced by international lawyers. It is certainly hard to find evidence of it in the literature.
	71. We should, however, try to think about whether the objection might be better formulated. Here is what we might say. International legislation is, first of all, legislation. Being legislation, it possesses qualities that are necessarily true of any legislation. Thus, if it is necessarily true that legislation is deliberately made, this would also be true of international legislation.
	72. In addition, the claim under consideration is about international legislation. And the notion of international legislation allows for the possibility that there are certain contingent properties of international legislation which serve to distinguish it from, say, domestic UK or US legislation. All these types of legislation, qua legislation, share properties which must necessarily be true of any legislation. But it is also the case that each type possesses certain distinctive properties which separate it from other types. Hence we may properly distinguish between UK primary legislation and US federal legislation on the basis that there are differing criteria that determine what counts as legislation within each legal system.
	73. These points help us to see more clearly how the objection – that international legislation is different – might run. I will suggest that the objection is better understood as referring to certain contingent criteria as to what counts as a legislative act in international law. According to the objection, one such criterion is the generality of the act’s normative content. The content must be general if the act is to count as international legislation – even if this is not true of legislation elsewhere, such as domestic UK or US legislation.​[88]​

IV.A.ii. Evidence in support of the objection

74. We may now consider the evidence in support of this objection. As we shall see, it is doubtful whether the evidence is sufficient. But first we need to know what the evidence is.
	75. It is not possible to canvass all the evidence in international law that might conceivably be adduced in support of the objection. What we can profitably do, however, is focus on an area which shows strong – ideally the strongest – evidential prospects. And if, even here, it turns out that the evidence is somewhat lacking, the first objection may begin to look a little shaky.
	76. With this in mind, I propose that we return to the arguments that the Security Council has begun to “legislate” on the international plane. This is an area which evinces sustained discussion about the very question of international legislation, and about the supporting evidence.​[89]​ By contrast, other areas do not seem to be as promising as regards the evidence that they might yield – e.g. the arguments about supposed “legislative” treaties, where the analysis of what counts as “legislation”, and of the available evidence, tends to be rather less developed.
	77. Let us turn to the discussion of Security Council “legislation”. In revisiting this material our aim is to give the objection its best chance of success. As I have been indicating, however, there is reason to think that the objection still falls short.
	78. In seeking to provide evidence in support of the objection, international lawyers may point to the available State practice concerning Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540. They may argue that if States are declaring that the Security Council has begun to legislate in Resolutions 1373 and 1540 (which are taken to be general in character) – if, in other words, States seem to be saying, or implying, that legislation is general – then this is what international legislation must be.​[90]​ Put simply, international legislation is general because States seem to say so.
	79. This approach faces several obstacles. Let us assume that State practice has a role to play in determining what counts as international legislation.​[91]​ There are good reasons to doubt whether State practice demonstrates that international legislation must be general – and, conversely, that it is impossible for non-general acts to count as international legislation. A significant quantity of the extant State practice consists of terse statements by State officials.​[92]​ Little can be drawn from such material. As far as I am aware, no State has offered a developed explanation of the criteria for international legislation.
	80. Furthermore, statements by State officials about Security Council legislation are often framed as criticisms.​[93]​ When a State official chastises the Security Council for “legislating” in a resolution, it is arguable that the criticism should not necessarily be taken at face value. It may simply be a rhetorical flourish rather than an accurate representation of the State’s beliefs about what counts as international legislation. In fact, it brings to mind a similar sort of criticism that we see in national contexts – namely, the familiar criticism that national courts are “legislating from the bench”. Such statements are not meant to indicate that the courts are producing legislation, properly understood; the critics in question do not mean to distinguish between those judicial decisions which are “legislative” and those which are not.
	81. Arguably, the same is true of much of the State practice in which the Security Council is accused of legislating. Reading these statements, one has the impression that the speakers are often hunting for an arresting turn of phrase. In criticizing Resolution 1540, for example, many States are not drawing sober, considered distinctions concerning the nature and sources of international law. They do not mean to distinguish between “legislative” resolutions and other situation-specific resolutions in that sort of way. Rather, their statements are colourful, informed by criticisms with which the State officials are acquainted from their own national legal systems – notably, the familiar criticism of “judicial legislation” or “legislating from the bench”.​[94]​ State practice concerning Security Council legislation is, to some extent, a reflection of this on the international plane. At the very least, this is one plausible reading, and it should be confronted squarely.​[95]​
	82. Even where the State practice is approving rather than critical, we must be circumspect. Parallels may again be drawn with what happens nationally. Take the US legal system. The noted US judge, Benjamin Cardozo, wrote about the judge as “legislator” in the context of a discussion about the positives that could come from judicial development of the law.​[96]​ We also find popular commentary, such as in the US news magazine TIME, about the good that can come from judges “legislating from the bench”.​[97]​ It would be a mistake to treat these writers as seeking to identify an alternative procedure for making legislation in the US. Nor are they seeking to distinguish between “legislative case law” and “non-legislative case law” within the US legal system. These references to legislation should not be taken literally. The same applies to many cases where State officials speak approvingly about Security Council legislation.
	83. So there are different ways to explain the State practice. Indeed, the State practice may well be divided across the various explanations. It is possible that some of the practice is indicative of States’ positions concerning the criteria for international legislation. Other statements may, for instance, be rhetorical flourishes and should not be taken at face value. Above all, we should not forget that the State practice tends to consist of terse comments from which little can reliably be drawn. Given all of this, there are compelling reasons to doubt whether, at present, State practice says anything useful about whether generality is a criterion for international legislation. And so this first objection is not a promising one.

IV.B. The Second Objection: A Stipulative Formulation of Legislation

84. There may be another way to defend the claim that legislation is general. It would be to say that this is not a descriptive claim – that is, a claim describing actual practices or usages – but rather a stipulative one. A stipulative formulation “imparts meaning to [a] term, and involves no commitment that the assigned meaning agrees with prior uses (if any) of the term”.​[98]​ International lawyers may simply stipulate that legislation is necessarily general in character. The stipulation cannot be said to be true (or false) because it does (or does not) conform to actual practices or usages.
	85. Two options present themselves. First, international lawyers may stipulate that international legislation is general. Second, they may stipulate that (all) legislation is general. An immediate problem, however, is that they do not appear to be making a stipulative claim of either sort. Rather, they rely upon actual usages or understandings in support of their claim – whether it is a claim about international legislation specifically, or about legislation more broadly. We have seen this in the foregoing discussion. International lawyers have, for instance, drawn upon State practice concerning Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540,​[99]​ and on evidence from national legal systems.​[100]​
	86. Even if we were to suppose that the claims about legislation are (or could be) stipulative, this does not mean that we cannot question the merit of stipulating. The stipulation cannot be true or false, but we may ask whether it is useful. What is achieved by stipulating? Why not provide a formulation of legislation (whether international legislation, or all legislation) which does seek to describe and account for existing usages? Arguably, stipulation is usefully employed to clarify an area that is otherwise obscured or weighed down by the terminology in common usage. For example, Wesley Hohfeld found the differing and shifting usages of the term “right” unhelpful. In seeking to improve our understanding of rights, he began by proposing precise stipulative meanings for various terms such as claims, liberties, powers and immunities. Hohfeldian terminology on rights is stipulative, not descriptive, but it is worthwhile because it clarifies our thinking on rights. Could the same be said for a stipulative claim about legislation, according to which legislation is necessarily general? It is doubtful how this would assist in our understanding of legislation, either on the international plane or more broadly.
	87. Furthermore, if international lawyers do mean to advance a stipulative claim about legislation, they must be forthright about the implications. Suppose, for example, that they stipulate that all legislation is necessarily general. Faced with the many thousands of non-general statutes enacted by the Westminster Parliament, they must deny that these are legislative acts, regardless of what English lawyers and legal officials might overwhelmingly think.
	88. Ultimately, this second objection does not seem credible. International lawyers do not (and, I suspect, may not wish to) put forward a stipulative claim about legislation. With that in mind, when I refer to the claim about legislation in the remainder of this essay I mean a descriptive claim.

V. The Second Thesis: A Mistake about Law

89. According to the first thesis that was presented, legislation has been misunderstood in international law. It would be remiss not to explain why this has happened. Although I do not wish to speculate on every possible reason, one reason is important. In some cases, it will be the sole reason why legislation has been misunderstood. In other cases, it will be one reason among several. (And in others still it may not be a reason at all.) In international law writing, a mistake is commonly made about what law is; the literature tends to evince the mistaken view that law is general. This is the second thesis that I will be defending.
	90. As with legislation, this second thesis concerns a theoretical problem that has troubled writers in various fields, not just international law. What follows is a cautious attempt to cast light on the darkness.

V.A. Explaining the Mistake

91. According to the second thesis, international law writing tends to evince the mistaken view that law is general. What does it mean to say that law is general?
	92. At the outset, it may be helpful to revisit our discussion about what makes a legal norm general – that is, what makes a legal norm a rule. Earlier I suggested the following as a plausible proposition:

G: A legal norm is general if it provides a standard of conduct that may be repeatedly applied from case to case.

G describes a rule. It was further noted that a rule may regulate the conduct of one, or more than one, subject:

G1: The standard of conduct applies to one subject.

G2: The standard of conduct applies to more than one subject.

In light of all this, to say that law is general is to say that, in terms of its normative content, only general norms can be law – and non-general norms cannot be law. Put another way, in terms of its normative content, law comprises only rules. (And of course some such rules may regulate one subject, and others many subjects.)
	93. However, this sort of view about law is mistaken. Law comprises non-general as well as general norms.​[101]​ Judicial orders are a familiar example of the former. And looking more closely at the idea of legislation has also provided a reason to doubt that law is general. For there is plentiful evidence of non-general legislation.
	94. As a theoretical matter, there is no good reason not to think that law comprises norms of all sorts, general and non-general. If we are to disagree with this, we need a clear theoretical explanation as to why non-general norms cannot be law. Yet no such explanation is forthcoming in international law writing.
	95. There is one notable pitfall that should be avoided, and that is overlooking the difference between law and a law. What is the difference? When we speak of a law – an individual law – we tend to have in mind a rule. On this view, a law is a general legal norm. Problems emerge, however, if the notion of a law is conflated with the notion of law. It may be thought that law is equivalent to laws (meaning rules). But that would be wrong. The noun “law” may usefully be understood as describing law as a genre. All sorts of legal norms, whether general (rules) or non-general (such as judicial orders), are law in the sense that they are legal artefacts belonging to law as a genre.​[102]​ For instance, a judicial order that I pay Hector a sum in compensation may not be thought of as a law; it is not a rule. But it is still law. It is a legal artefact, and part of the genre.
	96. Hans Kelsen provided a useful summary of these points. He stated that

[one] reason why the designation of law as “rule” is misleading is that the word “rule” carries the connotation of something “general.” A “rule” does not refer to a single non-recurring event but to a whole class of similar events … Having identified “law” and “rule,” we can of course recognize as law only general norms. But there is no doubt that law does not consist of general norms only. Law includes individual norms, i.e. norms which determine the behavior of one individual in one non-recurring situation and which therefore are valid only for one particular case and may be obeyed or applied only once. Such norms are “law” because they are parts of the legal order as a whole in exactly the same sense as … general norms … Examples of such particular norms are the decisions of courts as far as their binding force is limited to the particular case at hand … there is no reason why only general norms should be considered law.​[103]​

In addition, when discussing the notion of “sources of law”, Kelsen stated that

[t]he customary and the statutory creation of law are often regarded as the two “sources” of law. In this context, by “law” one usually understands only the general norms, ignoring the individual norms which, however, are just as much part of law as are the general ones.​[104]​

97. Similar points have also been made by other legal theorists.​[105]​ Lon Fuller, for example, has argued that although it is necessarily the case that law comprises rules, we should “in no way [think] that every governmental act possessing ‘the force of law’ – such as a judicial decree directed against a particular defendant – must itself take the form of laying down a general rule”.​[106]​
	98. Once this is grasped, there is no difficulty in recognizing that legislative norms may be general or non-general. However, if one makes the mistake of thinking that law is general, it follows that one would think that legislation is general, too.

V.B. Evidence of the Mistake in International Law

99. Can we find evidence in the literature of this misunderstanding about what law is? In what follows I will draw attention to some of the more prominent cases. These cases show that there is a commonly held and mistaken view that law is general – the view that, in terms of its normative content, law comprises only general norms or rules.
	100. A useful place to start is an influential essay by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in which he claims that law is general. That claim is foundational to his discussion about the proper way to understand international treaties. Fitzmaurice writes that “[t]reaties are [not] a formal source of law [because they] do not … create law in the proper sense of the term”.​[107]​ He goes on to explain what he means by “law in the proper sense of the term” – namely, “rules of general validity for and application to the subjects of the legal system, not arising from particular obligations or undertakings on their part”.​[108]​ Hence treaties are not in themselves law, because they are not general; to use Fitzmaurice’s words, they do not yield “rules of general validity for and application to the subjects of the legal system”.​[109]​ Rather, treaties represent obligations to which the law gives effect​[110]​ – meaning that they are “formally, a source of obligation rather than a source of law”.​[111]​
	101. This famous distinction between the sources of law and the sources of obligation has taken root in international law. At its base, in Fitzmaurice’s writing, is the mistaken view that law is general. And the long tendrils of his thinking can be seen throughout the literature.​[112]​
	102. One prominent example is Sir Ian Brownlie’s classic textbook, Principles of Public International Law. On the opening page, Brownlie lays the foundations of the book by discussing the “sources of the law”. Brownlie states:

It is common for writers to distinguish the formal sources and the material sources of law. The former are those legal procedures and methods for the creation of rules of general application which are legally binding on the addressees. The material sources provide evidence of the existence of rules which, when proved, have the status of legally binding rules of general application.​[113]​

On the next page of the book, Brownlie argues:

The law of treaties concerns the question of the content of obligations between individual states: the incidence of obligations resulting from express agreement. In principle, the incidence of particular obligations is a matter distinct from the sources. Terminology presents some confusion in this respect. Thus treaties binding a few states only are dubbed “particular international law” as opposed to “general international law” comprising multilateral “law-making” treaties to which a majority of states are parties. Yet in strictness there is no fundamental distinction here: both types of treaty only create particular obligations and treaties are as such a source of obligation and not a source of rules of general application.​[114]​

Both these passages perpetuate the mistaken view that law is general. In the first of the two passages, Brownlie treats the making of law as the making of “rules of general application”. In other words, law comprises rules of general application. Moreover, as the second passage makes clear, Brownlie thinks that in terms of its normative content law comprises only rules of general application. That is why treaties are not law in Brownlie’s view – because they do not, in his view, yield rules of general application.
	103. So Brownlie makes the mistake of thinking that law is general. There is no good reason for that view. No such reason is forthcoming in Brownlie’s writing. Nevertheless, the opening analysis of Brownlie’s book, concerning the sources of law, has been widely received.​[115]​ Brownlie’s mistake about law is retained in James Crawford’s updated edition of that book.​[116]​
	104. Other international lawyers have succumbed to this mistake about what law is.​[117]​ For instance, Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts, the editors of the pre-eminent Oppenheim’s International Law, write:

Treaties are … a formal source of international law in only a somewhat special sense. As a material source of law they have very considerable impact, but it may be strictly more correct to regard them formally as a source more of rights and obligations than of law, which is usually taken to require a generality and automaticity of application which treaties do not typically possess.​[118]​

To the extent that it presupposes that law is general, this passage is mistaken.​[119]​ Law comprises both general and non-general norms.
	105. The mistaken view that law is general is prevalent in international law. As we have seen, it informs the thinking that treaties are strictly not law because they are (deemed to be) non-general. In addition, it informs another approach, according to which some treaties are indeed general and may (for that reason) be characterized as “law-making”. The notion of general “law-making” treaties – distinguishable from “treaty-contracts” which are non-general – is also widespread in international legal thinking, and is based on the same mistake. For example, Malcolm Shaw takes this approach in his textbook on international law,​[120]​ as does Jan Klabbers.​[121]​
	106. Signs of the mistake can be seen in the work of the International Law Commission as well, on topics such as the unilateral acts of States. Various members of the Commission – including Martti Koskenniemi,​[122]​ Peter Tomka​[123]​ and Bruno Simma​[124]​ – have argued that unilateral acts are not in themselves law because such acts are non-general. Again, this view depends on the mistaken premise that law is general.
	107. To be clear, I make no claim about whether treaties are in fact law, whether some treaties may usefully be characterized as “law-making” treaties on some other basis, whether a sensible distinction may indeed be drawn between sources of law and sources of obligation, whether unilateral acts cannot be law, and so on. I take no position on these matters because the problems that they raise are varied and demanding; such questions are for another day. My aim is simply to draw out a mistake that underlies and informs much of the thinking in these areas.
	108. Let us return to legislation. Lawyers commonly say that legislation is law, or a source of law. If one commits the error of thinking that law is general – that, in terms of its normative content, law comprises only general norms or rules – it should come as no surprise that one would make the same mistake about legislation. This need not be the only reason why legislation has been misunderstood in international law.​[125]​ Nonetheless, I have paid attention to it because it is important, and because its elimination is a prerequisite for a reliable account of legislation. If law is misunderstood, so too is legislation.​[126]​

VI. The Implications of the Two Theses

109. Two theses have been advanced in this essay. First, in international law it is mistakenly thought that legislation is general. Second, international law writing tends to evince the mistaken view that law is general. These theses, if true, give rise to a number of implications, and I will touch on some of them here.
	110. To begin with, a defensible understanding of legislation and law is essential because they are fundamental ideas. A less than adequate grasp of them risks undermining our analysis of the legal world, and the mistakes can be easily magnified. We have seen already that a mistake about law may contribute to a misunderstanding of legislation.
	111. It is also possible, for example, that the mistakes about legislation and law have complicated our analysis of conflicts between treaties. We have seen that certain treaties tend to be characterized as “legislative” or “law-making” because they yield general norms (and, usually, because the treaties command a sizeable number of States parties as well). The notion of legislative or law-making treaties depends on a view about what legislation and law are. This, in turn, may shape – indeed, pollute – our thinking about how to address conflicts between treaties:

… international law has traditionally been highly ambivalent about conflicting treaties. With contractual undertakings, typically solutions derived from contractual notions have been advocated …
	With legislative treaties, there has always been a tendency, natural enough, to hold that later conflicting treaties be void, or at least left inapplicable, but this always stumbles over a number of hurdles …
	The alternative, however, would be to sanction a breach of the earlier treaty, something that can only with some reluctance be advocated, especially where legislative undertakings are concerned. It is no coincidence, then, that general multilateral treaties are often re-conceptualised as bundles of bilateral commitments; this, while sometimes far-fetched, would somehow make it seem more natural to apply a contractual principle.​[127]​

If unsound understandings of legislation and law do figure (in an analytically significant way) in the inquiry into treaty conflicts and how they might be addressed, this would seem to reinforce the case for the importance of theoretical hygiene.
	112. Equally, sound understandings of legislation and law are needed if we are to pursue cutting edge questions such as whether new sources of international law may be emerging.​[128]​ Theoretically ambitious international lawyers may have just such a question in mind when they think about Security Council “legislation”. If certain Security Council resolutions are “legislative”, might we therefore regard them as a (new) source of law?
	113. Without this sort of pay-off, the debate about Security Council resolutions may look to some eyes like a mere terminological quibble. But the problem, as we know, is that the debate rests on shaky foundations – namely, some precarious assumptions about what legislation and law are. Few issues are more foundational than a legal system’s recognized sources of law. If we are trying to establish what sources of international law there might be, I am not sure that we have any other choice but to proceed cautiously and to be prepared to scrutinize even our most primitive assumptions.
	114. We are also reminded in all of this that turning to theoretical claims is at times unnecessary or unwise, and the additional trouble is best avoided. This note of caution rings true, I think, as regards a great deal of the international law writing on legislation – including a large part of the debate about Security Council “legislation”. We have spent some time exploring this debate because it conveniently illustrates how legislation has been misunderstood; but we should also ask to what extent it has been necessary (or desirable) to enlist difficult theoretical claims about legislation in the first place.
	115. In many instances it might have been better simply to focus on explaining how certain Security Council resolutions are (in some sense) general, rather than complicating the picture by introducing a theoretical proposition about “legislation” into the mix. International lawyers – at least, those abstaining from theoretically ambitious questions concerning the sources of international law – could simply say that the certain Security Council resolutions are general, or that they yield general norms.​[129]​ They could then concentrate on the questions that they often do mean to address – e.g. whether the Security Council is legally empowered to adopt such resolutions under the UN Charter and, if so, when and how that power should be exercised.​[130]​ “Legislation” need not enter the frame. Introducing that idea is a distraction – and more than that, a source of confusion.
	116. Still, what of the theoretically ambitious international lawyer who does remain keen to examine the possibility of Security Council “legislation”? Here, the way forward is uncertain. We have worked through the argument that the Security Council, in adopting Resolutions 1373 and 1540, has begun to legislate on the international plane. The difficulty is that the argument relies on a misunderstanding of legislation. This much we can say. Beyond this, there are only questions. In principle, a legislative act may be general or non-general. It is therefore possible to contend that the Security Council, in adopting legally binding resolutions throughout its history, has always been legislating – and Resolutions 1373 and 1540 should not in this respect be singled out. Alternatively, we may argue that no Security Council resolution is legislative, on the basis that there are additional criteria for legislation which all Security Council resolutions fail to satisfy.




118. I have suggested that legislation is not well understood in international law, and that this may be driven, in part, by a mistake about law itself. To legislate is to make law, but not any law. Legislating is a distinct type of law-making which yields a distinct type of law, and such law is to be distinguished from other types of law such as customary law. Furthermore, in terms of its normative content, law – including legislated law – may be general or non-general.








^1	   	Specifically, Art. 39 of the Charter provides that the Security Council “shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security”.
^2	   	Either the resolution as a whole, or certain operative paragraphs of the resolution, may be adopted under Chapter VII. As an aside, there is a debate about whether resolutions adopted under another Chapter of the UN Charter are also binding. The answer depends on how we interpret the UN Charter (including, in particular, Arts. 24 and 25), as well as the resolution in question. See e.g. Rosalyn Higgins, “The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are Binding Under Article 25 of the Charter?” (1972) 21 ICLQ 270.
^3	   	Other candidate resolutions have also been proposed – e.g. Resolutions 1566 (2004) and 2178 (2014), both concerning terrorism. As regards Resolution 2178, Marko Milanović suggests that it is “one of the most important quasi-legislative efforts of the Council since resolution 1373 (2001)”; see Marko Milanović, “UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 2178 on Foreign Terrorist Fighters” (24 September 2014) EJIL: Talk!  <http://www.ejiltalk.org/un-security-council-adopts-resolution-2178-on-foreign-terrorist-fighters/>. On the supposedly legislative character of Resolution 2178 see also Kristen E. Boon, “U.N. Sanctions as Regulation” (2016) 15 Chinese Journal of International Law 543, 552; José E. Alvarez, The Impact of International Organizations on International Law (Brill 2017) 125-127.
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